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Hahn: Civil Rights

CIVIL RIGHTS

EVOLUTION OF THE HOSTILE WORKPLACE
CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII:
ONLY SENSITIVE MEN
NEED APPLY.
I.

INTRODUCTION:

In Ellison u. Brady 1, ("Ellison"), a panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered three questions regarding hostile
workplace sexual harassment claims that had not previously
been addressed in the Circuit. 2 The Court first considered the
question of what level of conduct was necessary to support a
hostile workplace claim, holding that the plaintiff need not have
suffered any actual psychological harm, but that it was enough
that the complained-of conduct was sufficiently "severe and pervasive" that it had unreasonably altered the terms and conditions of employment. 3 The Court then turned to the question
of how the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct should be
determined. The Court held that in determining whether there
was in fact an actionably hostile workplace, courts must review
the challenged conduct from the perspective of a reasonable
member of the class of persons to which the victim belongs. 4 In
what is the most widely publicized aspect of the opinion,6 the
Court held that the sued-upon conduct in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases had to be viewed from the
perspective of a "reasonable woman."6
The Court also held that the reasonableness of an employer's response to sexual harassment in the workplace depends
1. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Beezer, J., with whom
Kozinski, J., joined; Stephens, J., Senior United States District Judge for the Central
District of California, sitting by designation, dissenting).
2. Id. at 875-76.
3. Id. at 876-78.
4. Id. at 878.
5. E.g., Business Week, Oct. 28, 1991, at 30; Time, Oct. 21, 1991, at 52; U.S. News
& World Report, Nov. 18, 1991, at 30.
6. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79.
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on the response's ability not just to end the particular harassment, but to assure a workplace free from sexual harassment. 7
In what may be the part of the case with the most wideranging implications for employers and employees alike, the
Court specifically held that in order to avoid liability, employers may be required to fire those employees whose mere presence creates a hostile work environment. 8
II.

FACTS

Kerry Ellison ("Ellison") and Sterling Gray ("Gray") were
co-workers at the IRS office in San Mateo, California. 9 Gray
invited Ellison to lunch, during which they stopped at Gray's
house to retrieve his son's forgotten lunch. 10 Afterwards, Gray
began to hang around Ellison's desk unnecessarily.11 Ellison
declined his next invitation because she was uncomfortable
being alone with him.12 When she received a strange note from
Gray at work,13 Ellison became frightened and showed the
note to their supervisor, who called the note "sexual harassment. "14 Ellison asked the supervisor not take any action and,
in an effort to handle the situation herself, asked a male coworker to tell Gray to leave her alone. 16
A few days later, Ellison left for a training session in St.
Louis. While there, she received a second letter from Gray.18 On
her return to San Mateo, Ellison requested that either she or
7. [d. at 882.
8. [d. at 883.

9. Ellison v. Brady. 924 F.2d 872. 873 (9th Cir. 1991). They were not friends and
did not work closely. [d.
10. [d.
11. [d.
12. [d. at 874.

13. The note read: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. 1 have
never been in such constant term oil (sic). Thank you for talking with me. 1 could not
stand to feel your hatred for another day." Ellison. 924 F.2d at 874.
14. [d.
15. [d.

16. This letter read. in part:
"I know that you are worth knowing with or without
sex .... Leaving aside the hassles and disasters of recent
weeks. 1 have enjoyed you so much over these past few
months. Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away.
Admiring your style and elan .... Don·t you think it odd that
two people who have never even talked together. alone. are
striking off such intense sparks ... 1 will [write] another letter in the near future."
[d.
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Gray be transferred to another IRS office. 17 The supervisor told
Gray not to contact Ellison, and Gray voluntarily transferred
to the San Francisco office. 18 Three weeks later, Gray filed a
union grievance, seeking to return to San Mateo. 19 When
Ellison learned of Gray's efforts to return, she filed a formal
complaint with the IRS and obtained permission to temporarily transfer to San Francisco upon Gray's return to San
Mateo. 2o
.
The IRS employee investigating Ellison's complaint, like
Ellison's supervisor, found that Gray's conduct amounted to sexual harassment. 21 In reviewing that determination, however,
the Treasury Department held that Ellison's complaint did
not involve a pattern or practice covered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations. 22 On
administrative appeal by Ellison, the EEOC affirmed this
decision on the alternate ground that the IRS took adequate
measures to prevent future harassment. 23
Ellison then sued the Secretary of the Treasury under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary because
Ellison failed to state a prima facie case of sexual
harassment. 25 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit conducted a de
novo review 28 and reversed the district court's decision. 27
17.Id.
18. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 874.
19. Id. The IRS and the union agreed that Gray could return to San Mateo
after a total of six months at the San Francisco office, if he promised to leave Ellison
alone.ld.
20. Id. Meanwhile, Gray sent a third letter, holding the idea that Ellison and Gray
had a relationship. It is not clear that Ellison received this letter. Id. at 874-75 n.2.
21. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875.
22. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). The EEOC is the agency charged with
enforcing Title VII. Id.
23. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875.
24. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982), which reads: MIt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment bec~use of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
25. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875.
26. Id. at 873 (citing Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988). The
grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 1320).
27. Id. at 883. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Id.
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BACKGROUND

A.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AS DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 28 The inclusion of
sex-based discrimination in Title VII was made at the last
minute, and there is, accordingly, little legislative history
relating to sex-based discrimination. 29 In early cases asserting
claims for workplace sexual harassment, the courts did not recognize sexual harassment as a form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 30 In Corne and De Vane v. Bausch & Lomb,31
for example, the court held that sexual advances were not
discrimination in violation of Title VII because the harasser was
satisfying a "personal urge," not serving any employer policy.32
Similar conduct was also held non-actionable in Miller v. Bank
ofAmerica 33 because the court found the harassment was "isolated" and not the result of a company policy imposing or permitting consistent sex-based discrimination. 54
Sexual harassment was first recognized as discrimination
prohibited under Title VII in Williams v. Saxbe. 36 Williams
held that a supervisor's retaliation against a female employee for refusing sexual advances is prohibited sex discrimination. 36 The Fourth Circuit later held that a supervisor's
sexual advances, along with the existence of a practice so pervasive as to constitute a de facto company policy of compelling
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). See infra note 24 for the text of this statute.
29. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 67, 63-64 (1986) (citing 110 CONGo
REC. 2,677-84 (1964».
30. E.g., Come and DeVane V. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 662 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1977); Miller V. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
31. 390 F. Supp. at 162. (Alleging repeated verbal and physical sexual advances
by male supervisor).
32. [d. at 163.
33. 418 F. Supp at 234. (Alleging male supervisor dismissed female employee for
refusing sexual advances).
34. [d. at 236.
35. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). On remand, the trial court held that submission to supervisor's advances
was a term of employment in violation of Title VII. Williams V. Civiletti, 487 F.
Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980~
36. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 662-63.
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employees to submit to sexual advances, violated Title VII in
Garber v. Saxon Business Products. 37 Shortly thereafter, in
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas,38 the Third Circuit
held that a supervisor's conditioning further employment on
submission to his sexual demands violated Title VII.39 In these
cases, the courts recognized that harassment keyed to continuing employment and/or promotion fell within the definition
of sex discrimination, but did not consider whether other
forms of sexual harassment might also violate Title VII.
In 1980, the EEOC promulgated regulations ("the
Guidelines") recognizing that sexual harassment falls within
the definition of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.40
The Guidelines define sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature. "41 The guidelines recognize
two categories of sexual harassment. 42 The first, quid pro quo
harassment, occurs when terms of employment are conditioned on submission to sexual harassment. 43 The second, hostile work environment harassment, occurs where unwelcome
sexual conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment."«
After the promulgation of the EEOC Guidelines, courts began
to recognize hostile work environment harassment as actionable sex discrimination.
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held in Bundy v. Jackson 46 that under the Guidelines,
constant sexual propositions, without direct threat of adverse
job-related consequences for refusal, was prohibited sex
discrimination. 48 The Bundy court extended Title VII protection
37. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). (Alleging discharge for refusing male supervisor's sexual advances).
38. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). (Alleging employment conditioned on submission to sexual advances).
39. Id. at 1048-49.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a) (1990).
41. Id.
42. See generally C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47
(1979) for a discussion of quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1), (2) (1990).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a) (3) (1990).
45. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 946.
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to harassment victims who suffer no economic harm in connection with the harassment in order to prevent employers from
allowing sexual harassment and yet avoiding Title VIIliability by "carefully stopping short of' taking steps to cause the
employee economic detriment. 47 The Eleventh Circuit relied on
Bundy and the Guidelines in Henson v. City of Dundee. 48 The
court held that sexual harassment creating a hostile work
environment violates Title VII where the plaintiff proves that
she belongs to a protected group and was subject to unwelcome
sex-based harassment which affected a "term, condition, or
privilege of employment. "49 The Fourth Circuit also recognized
the viability of hostile environment claims in Katz v. Dole. 60
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 61 the United States
Supreme Court held that hostile work environment sexual
harassment can amount to sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII. 62 In so holding, the Court looked to race and national origin cases which found that actions by the employer which
create a hostile work environment are prohibited under Title
VIps The Court also found persuasive the statement in the
Guidelines that harassment resulting in noneconomic injury
can violate Title VII.64 Further, the Court held that sexual
harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment. "66 The Court quickly concluded,
without elaboration, that in the case before it the harasser's
alleged conduct, which included rape, met the "sufficiently
severe or pervasive" test. 66 While the Court did not provide specific guidance on how a hostile work environment claim was to
be proven, it nonetheless held definitively that once such a
47. [d. at 945.
48. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
49. [d. at 903-04.
50. 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). (Alleging co-worker sexual harassment created hostile work environment).
51. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
52. [d. at 67.
53. [d. at 66. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972) (Discriminatory services to Hispanic clientele); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied Bub nom., Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (Prohibiting racially segregated supper clubs).
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a) (3) (1990).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904
(11th Cir. 1982».
56. [d.
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claim was proven, the plaintiff had a cause of action under Title
VII, and that no economic loss need be shown by the plaintiff. 57

B.

DETERMINING WHEN CONDUCT CREATES A HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT

Not all sexual harassment creates an actionable hostile
work environment. 68 The Court in Meritor held that a hostile
work environment claim has three elements: (1) the plaintiff
must have been subjected to "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature;"69 (2) the conduct must have been unwelcome;60 and (3)
the conduct must have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter employment conditions and create an abusive work
environment. 61 The focus of the courts in most hostile environment claims has been on the third element, specifically, how
to determine whether conduct is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create a hostile work environment. A primary point
of contention in this regard has been over whose perspective
courts should consider in measuring the severity and pervasiveness of the complained -of conduct. 82
According to the EEOC, no single factor determines whether
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to violate Title VII.
Rather, the EEOC looks to the totality of the circumstances in
making this determination. 63 A pattern of harassment generally creates a stronger hostile environment claim than an isolated incident. 54 However, because employees need not subject
themselves to extended periods of harassment to receive Title
VII protection, courts should, according to the EEOC, consider the conduct's degree of offensiveness. 66 The EEOC suggests
that the challenged conduct be evaluated from the objective
57. [d. at 67-68.
58. See [d. at 67; Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (Mere utterance of racial epithet not
violation).
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990».
60. [d. at 68. Whether the plaintifTvoluntarily submitted to sexual advances is
irrelevant; courts must focus on whether the plaintiff indicated that sexual advances
were unwelcome. [d. However, a plaintiffs provocative speech and dress are relevant
in determining whether she found the alleged conduct unwelcome. [d. at 69.
61. [d. at 67.
62. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text for discussion.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1990).
64. EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Employment Practices
Manual (BNA) 405:6681, 6690 (March 19, 1990).
65. [d.
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perspective of a reasonable person to avoid employer liability
for the complaints of hyper-sensitive employees. 86 The EEOC
also notes that because seemingly harmless conduct may
nevertheless create a hostile work environment, the "reasonableness" standard should consider the victim's perspective and
ignore "stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior. "67
Prior to Ellison, the Ninth Circuit had not had to consider
the standard for evaluating the nature or extent of the conduct
necessary to support a hostile work environment claim. Hostile
work environment cases had only been before the Ninth Circuit
on three occasions. In Jordan v. Clark 86 and Vasconcelos v.
Meese,69 the only issue before the Court was whether the
District Court's factual findings against the plaintiff were
clearly erroneous and, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that
the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous because the
plaintiff's testimony was properly disbelieved; thus, the Courts
had no occasion to reach the issue of what was actionable conduct. 70 In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Hacienda Hotel,71 the Ninth Circuit held, without discussion,
that a hostile work environment existed where women employees were repeatedly subjected to sexual vulgarities and requests
for sexual favors. 72
The question of what kind of conduct was actionable had,
however, been addressed in several other Circuits prior to
Ellison. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining CO.78, the Sixth Circuit
held that conduct creates a hostile work environment where it
would interfere with a reasonable person's work performance
AND seriously affect the reasonable person's psychological wellbeing. 74 Additionally, the Court held that a plaintiff must
prove that she was actually offended and injured by the alleged
conduct. 76 The existence of a hostile work environment depends,
66. 1d. at 6689.
67. 1d. at 6690.
68. 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. cknied sub nom., Jordan V. Hodel, 488 U.S.
1066 (1989).
69. 907 F.2d III (9th Cir. 1990).
70. Jordan, 847 F.2d at 1375; Vasconcelos, 907 F.2d at 112.
71. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
72. 1d. at 1515.
73. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. cknied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
74. 1d. at 620. However, Justice Keith's dissent urged adoption of the reasonable
woman perspective. 1d. at 626.
75. 1d. at 620.
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the Sixth Circuit held, on the objective and subjective circumstances of each case, including the nature of the harassment,
the backgrounds of the plaintiff and her co-workers and supervisors, the physical environment of the workplace, the level of
obscenity in the workplace and plaintiff's reasonable expectations in accepting employment. 76
In Brooms v. Regal Tube CO.,77 the Seventh Circuit also
used a standard which considered both objective and subjective
factors, but did not require Rabidue's strict finding of a serious effect on the plaintiff's psychological well-being. Brooms
held that harassment was actionably severe or pervasive when
it would "adversely affect both a reasonable person and the particular plaintiff. "78 The Seventh Circuit applied an objective
"reasonable person" test and, at the same time, considered the
harassment's actual effect on the plaintiff.
While accepting the objective/subjective test generally, the
Third Circuit modified the objective aspect of that test in
Andrews v. City ofPhiladelphia. 79 Rather than judging alleged
harassment from the perspective of the apparently gender
neutral "reasonable person" used in Rabidue and Brooms, the
court held that sexual harassment which would "detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position" creates a hostile work environment. so In adopting this victim-oriented perspective, the court focused first on
Congressional intent in enacting Title VII, which it found to be
"'the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment... .'''81 The court found that the principle
76. Id. at 620-21
[Ijt cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines
may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this.
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity
for the female workers of America. But it is quite different
to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American workers.
Id. (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1984».
77. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
78. Id. at 419. Accord Kingv. Board of Regents ofUniv. of Wis. System, 898 F.2d
533,537 (7th Cir. 1990).
79. 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990).
80.Id.
81. Id. at 1483 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971».
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barrier facing women was the fact that the mere existence of
harassment deters women from "joining the work force or
accepting certain jobs. "82 Adjudging the impropriety of the
allegedly harassing conduct from a woman's perspective
ensures that the barriers are removed and that women are
allowed to engage in "self-respecting employment."83 The Court
also stated that the "reasonableness" element of the test protects employers from liability for the reactions of hyper-sensitive employees. 84 The gender-specific aspect of the test
recognizes that men and women have different perceptions of
what type of conduct may amount to sexual harassment. 86

Ellison was the first case in the Ninth Circuit to consider
the standard by which to determine whether conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, and had the divergent views of other circuits, discussed above, from which to choose.
C.

EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Meritor touched briefly on the question of employer liability, but noted that its discussion had "a rather abstract quality about it given the state of the record."8B Although the issue
had been extensively briefed by the parties, as well as the
EEOC as amicus curiae, the Court expressly declined to set out
any definite rules on employer liability in hostile work environment cases. 87 However, the Court did give some indications
of its thoughts on the matter in dicta.
In Meritor, where the harasser was a supervisor, the Court
distinguished between quid pro quo harassment and hostile
workplace harassment for purposes of employer liability. In
quid pro quo cases, the Court stated that liability should be
determined under traditional agency principals,88 and that if
82.Id.
83.Id.
84. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483.
85. Id. at 1485-86 (quoting Bennett v. Coroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106
(5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1988) and citing Note, Sexual Harassment
Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VI/, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1984).
Women often perceive workplace conduct as sexually harassing, while men perceive
the same conduct as harmless and innocent. Id. at 1451).
86. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
87.Id.
88. Id. at 70 (quoting brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 22).
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the offending supervisor exercised actual or apparent authority granted by the employer in making or threatening to make
employment decisions depend on or relating to the supervisor's
sexual harassment, then the employer would be held liable even
if the employer had neither actual nor constructive notice of the
wrongful conduct. S9
In contrast, the Court stated that the employer's liability
was not to be determined by agency principles in hostile
workplace cases. 90 Instead, the inquiry would focus first on
whether the employer had "an expressed policy against sexual harassment and had implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims. "91 If such
a program is in place and the employee fails to avail herself
of the remedies provided, then, the Court indicated, the
employer would be "shielded from liability absent actual
knowledge [by the employer] of the sexually hostile environment . . . . "92 However, the Court promptly disclaimed the
notion that the existence of an expressed policy against sexual harassment and a grievance procedure was, without more,
enough for an employer to avoid liability. Instead, the Court
said that if the grievance procedure was not reasonably "calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward,"93
then the employee's failure to avail herself of those procedures
would not bar her claim. 94
Again, it should be noted that Meritor involved harassment by a supervisor, not a co-worker. 96 Generally, the EEOC
and courts hold that employers are liable for sexual harassment
among co-workers "where the employer ... knows or should
have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action."98 An employer's
knowledge of sexual harassment is shown where complaints are
made to the employer or where the harassment is particularly pervasive, the employer may be charged with constructive
knowledge. 9? Additionally, liability has been imputed where
89. [d.

90. [d. at 71 (quoting brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26).
91. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71.
92. [d.

93. [d. at 73.
94. [d. at 72.
95. [d. at 59.
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(d) (1990).
97. Katz, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983).
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employers anticipated or should have reasonably anticipated
sexual harassment and failed to take actions reasonably calculated to prevent its occurrence. 98
Courts have also addressed an issue not mentioned at all
in Meritor: the circumstances under which an employer is
liable for its response to complaints of sexual harassment
when an employee makes a complaint of sexual harassment
and/or when the employer is charged with constructive notice
of particularly pervasive harassment. The rule that evolved in
that connection was that upon actual or constructive notice of
sexual harassment, employers must take prompt remedial
action to avoid Title VII liability.99 Remedies must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. loo One court rejected
the argument that the complained-of incidents of sexual harassment warranted dismissal of the offender. lol Another court
held that if an employer's response to sexual harassment was
"reasonably calculated to end the harassment," liability should
generally not be imposed, even though the employer's response
was unsuccessful. 102 Swentek v. USAIR Inc. 103 provides an example of "immediate and appropriate corrective action" where, following a complaint, the harasser was given a written warning
to refrain from using foul language and informed that any
further complaint would lead to suspension. l04 Also, where an
employee had previously engaged in severe sexual harassment, thereafter, his mere presence in the workplace may create a hostile work environment. l06
98. Paroline v. UNISYS Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 107 (4th Cir. 1989) rehearing en banc
granted, vacated in part on other grounds 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (Employer liability from knowledge of previous harassment).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1990). See also Katz, 709 F.2d at 256.
100. Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987). The
employer's remedial action was ·unusually prompt- where the harassment occurred
for two days before the company president assured the plaintiff that she would not work
with the offender after the following day. [d. at 309.
101. Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984). Reprimanding,
placing on 90 days probation and warning the offender that further sexual harassment
would result in discharge was sufficient remedial action. [d. at 427.
102. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256 (Policy against sexual harassment, including seminars on the subject for supervisors, insufficient response to sexual harassment). See
also Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989). (Look at success and
reasonableness of response).
103. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
104. [d. at 558.
105. See Paroline v. UNISYS Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1989), rehearing en bane granted, vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
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81

THE ELLISON COURT'S ANALYSIS
THE LEVEL OF CONDUCT THAT CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION

Ellison represented the first occasion for the Ninth Circuit
to consider several aspects of hostile workplace claims. 106 The
first of these was what conduct would give rise to a hostile
workplace claim. 107 Specifically, the Ellison court had to give definition to an element of sexual harassment claims that had been
stated in broad terms by Meritor: the requirement that the challenged conduct be sufficiently "severe and pervasive" to either
unreasonably interfere with an individual's work performance
or create a hostile employment environment. 106 The severity and
pervasiveness test on its face requires looking to both the
quality and the quantity of the conduct involved. In formulating
its analytical framework, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
required showing of severity varies inversely with the
pervasiveness. 109 It also noted that the trial court had made its
decision without any controlling precedent concerning conduct such as Gray's, which fell "somewhere between forcible
rape and the mere utterance of an epithet. "110
The District Court had found that Gray's conduct was "isolated and genuinely trivial."111 The Secretary of the Treasury
urged the Ninth Circuit to affirm that result, and in doing so
to adopt the analysis in two cases which found no Title VII violation on behavior more egregious than Gray's. 112 Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. held that a plaintiff must feel "anxiety and
debilitation" sufficient to "poison" her working environment to
support a claim.l13 Rabidue required a showing that the
106. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991).
107. Id. at 877-78.
108. Id. at 878-81.
109. Id. at 878 (citing Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510
(11th Cir. 1989) (Hostile work environment where noose hung over employee's work
station twice».
110. Id. at 877 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60, 67).
111. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
112. Id. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (No hostile work environment where repeatedly propositioned, winked at, offered a rubdown, asked "what will I get for it?" in response to requests for advice, slapped on the
buttocks, and told probably moans and groans during sex); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,622 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (No
hostile work environment where routine sexual vulgarities and pictures of scantily clad
women throughout office).
113. Scott, 798 F.2d at 619.
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reasonable person's psychological well-being would have been
seriously and adversely affected by the alleged conduct. u4
The Ninth Circuit rejected both Scott and Rabidue and
reversed the trial court's finding in the case before it for two
reasons. ll6 First, the court found that Title VII provides employees with protection before their psychological well-being is
actually harmed by sex discrimination. U6 More important, the
standards used in Scott and Rabidue concentrate on the severity of the effect on the victim, but it is the conduct itself, not
its effect, that is the focus of Title VII.ll7

B.

THE GAUGE BY WHICH TO MEASURE CONDUCT

Having defined the kind of conduct that was actionable, the
court then had to decide the standard by which to measure the
conduct involved. Some cases had stated that the conduct had
to be assessed using the classic "reasonable person" approach
of tort law. uB Another court had held that the conduct should
be measured from the perspective of a "reasonable member of
the same sex. "119 The Ellison court adopted the latter view, holding that the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment
must be determined from the perspective of the victim. 120
Elliso~ reasoned that courts must acknowledge that the perspectives held by men and women concerning appropriate sexual conduct are disparate. 121 Women share concerns about
sexual conduct not generally held by men 122 and may find
conduct offensive which men generally find appropriate. 123
114. Rabidue, 805 r.2d at 619.
115. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78.
116. Id. See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Employment
Practices Manual (BNA) 405:6681, 6690, n.20 (March, 19 1990).
117. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78.
118. E.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419
(7th Cir. 1989).
119. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990).
120. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. The reasonable person standard may reinforce discriminatory conduct considered acceptable by some. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 879. See Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989). Vulnerability to sexual coercion can
make women wary of sexual encounters. Women tend to have more restrictive views
on the appropriateness of sexual conduct. Id. at 1205; Federal Bureau ofInvestigation,
Uniform Crime Reports for 1988 at 16 (l989) (73 of every 100,000 females reported rape
victims, 1988).
123. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79 (citing Lipsett v. Univ. ofP.R., 864 F.2d 881 (let
Cir. 1988). "[T]he man may not realize his conduct is offensive and the woman may

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/9

14

Hahn: Civil Rights

1992]

CIVIL RIGHTS

83

Therefore, the court must look solely to the perspective of a person of the victim's gender; a female plaintiff'24 states a viable
hostile environment claim if she proves that a "reasonable
woman" would consider the alleged conduct sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter work conditions and create an abusive
working environment. 126 The Court held that a reasonable
woman could find Gray's conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an abusive work environment and remanded
the case for trial under that standard. 126

C. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE RESPONSES TO CHARGES
OF HARASSMENT
Finally, the Court turned to the question of liability arising from the employer's response to claims of sexual harassment. The Ellison court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's
holding that an employer's response must be reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 127 However, Ellison went further and stated that the reasonableness of an employer's
response is dependent not just on actually stopping the particular harassment; employer penalties must also ultimately
be geared towards assuring a workplace free from sexual
harassment. 128 In evaluating employer responses, courts must
also consider the remedy's ability to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 129 In failing to discipline Gray, the
court inferred that the IRS sent a message to potential
harassers that they would not be disciplined. 130
be fearful of criticizing her supervisor." Id. at 898). See Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1987). "We recognize that men and women are vulnerable in different
ways and offended by different behavior." Id. at 637 n.2; Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths
and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law 99 YALE
L.J. 1177 (1990). Men "tend to view 'milder' forms of harassment, such as suggestive
looks, repeated requests for dates, and sexist jokes, as harmless social interactions
.... " Id. at 1207-08.
124. The court noted that in cases where a man is the sexual harassment victim,
a reasonable man standard applies. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 n.ll.
125. Id. at 879. The court explained that the reasonable woman standard does
not give women more protection than men. Instead, it counterbalances the regular failure to acknowledge the experiences of women. Id. Cf, State v. Wanrow, Wash.2d
221,239-241,559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (1977) (en bane) (reasonable woman standard for
self defense).
126. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
127. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir.
1983».
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 882. See also 29 C.F.R. §1604.ll(f) (1990) "Prevention is the best tool
for the elimination of sexual harassment." Id.
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The Ellison court also held that employers may well have
to do more than simply ask offenders to refrain from further
harassment. lSI Instead, employers may have to remove from the
workplace, either by transfer or if necessary, termination,
those employees whose mere presence would create a hostile
work environment for the reasonable woman;IS2 otherwise, the
harassment has not been eliminated, and the message that the
employer is serious about eliminating sexual harassment is not
effective. ISS The Court stated that the IRS did not sufficiently
consider Ellison's interest in failing to try and determine the
impact of Gray's presence at the office on Ellison. lS4 Further, a
six month separation may have been minimal punishment in
relation to the nature of Gray's conduct. lSG
V.

CRITIQUE

A.

ELLISON'S FOCUS ON CONDUCT, RATHER THAN THE DEGREE OF
INJURY CAUSED BY THE CONDUCT, COMPORTS WITH THE INTENT

UNDERLYING TITLE

VII.

In considering the level of severity and pervasiveness necessary to state a sexual harassment claim under a hostile
work environment theory, the Ellison court expressly rejected
the reasoning of two cases which had required the plaintiff to
show that the conduct was of a kind and degree that it would
cause a reasonable person either such severe "anxiety and
debilitation" that the workplace was "poisoned" or that the conduct would "affect seriously the psychological well-being" of a
reasonable person. ISS Ellison's rejection of that reasoning was
well-taken. The flaw in Scott and Rabidue is that they focus on
the injury caused, not the conduct itself. Rabidue directly
enunciates what is implicit in both decisions: the supposition
131. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. The IRS did not express strong disapproval of Gray's
conduct, reprimand, put him on probation, or inform him that further harassment
would result in suspension or termination. Id.
132. Id. at 883. An employee would have likely engaged in particularly egregious
conduct for his mere presence to create a hostile work environment. Id.
133. Id. at n.19.
134. Id. On remand, the district court was instructed to determine whether
Gray's mere presence would create a hostile environment for a reasonable woman.
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 883.
135. Id. at 883. The district court was instructed to explore the facts surrounding the government's decision to return Gray to San Mateo. Id.
136. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991). See Scott, 798 F.2d at
213; Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619.
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that Title VII was not intended to bring about a "transformation
of social mores .... "137 In fact, that is exactly what Congress
intended in enacting Title VII, which is a remedial statute that
is to be interpreted broadly to effectuate a fundamental change
in the manner in which people interact in the workplace and,
hopefully by extension, how they relate outside the workplace. I3B
There is, as well, another flaw in Scott and Rabidue which
was not directly noted in Ellison. Both cases require a far
higher showing of severity and pervasiveness than the EEOC
Guidelines. I39 Indeed, Rabidue itself states that while courts
may give "favorable consideration" to the Guidelines, they
"are intra-agency suggested interpretative regulations that are
not binding on the courts. "140 While it may be that the
Guidelines are not binding, Meritor makes plain that in sexual
harassment cases, the Guidelines are to be accorded considerable weight, not the mere cursory review afforded them by
Rabidue. I41

B.

THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD IS CONSONANT WITH
CONGRESS' INTENT TO OPEN THE WORKPLACE BY ELIMINATING BAR-

RIERS TO EMPLOYMENT CAUSED BY SEXUAL HARASSMENT.

The Ninth Circuit's reasonable woman standard is not the
radical departure that it might seem to be at first blush; it is
instead, consonant with the development of hostile work
environment law in other circuits. In 1986, the Sixth Circuit
analyzed whether alleged sexual conduct would cause serious
psychological damage from the perspective of the "reasonable
person" in Rabidue. 142 However, for the first time in a judicial
opinion,I43 Justice Keith suggested in dissent that the courts
adopt the reasonable woman standard to analyze the severity
137. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 621.
138. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F.2d 234, 238
(5th Cir. 1971).
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(3). Sexual conduct violates Title VII when it "has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile of offensive working environment-. Id.
140. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619 n.4.
141. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
142. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 6ll, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
143. See Comment, Se%ual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984) (Suggesting the adoption of the
reasonable woman standard).
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and pervasiveness of sexual harassment. 144 Justice Keith
explained that the reasonable woman standard appropriately
accounts for the gender-based divergence in views on appropriate sexual conduct. 146
One year later, the Sixth Circuit used the "reasonable
woman" standard in Yates v. AVCO Corporation. l46 The Court
held that in the context of a constructive discharge claim147
based on the sexual harassment of a female subordinate by a
male supervisor, the facts must establish that the reasonable
woman would have felt compelled to resign to state an actionable claim. 148 In a footnote, the court cited Justice Keith's dissent and acknowledged that "men and women are vulnerable
in different ways and offended by different behavior."149While
the Sixth Circuit has not yet recognized the reasonable woman
standard in the context of co-worker hostile environment
claims, it has now recognized the reasonable woman's perspective in a related area of sexual harassment law.
The following year, the First Circuit, in Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, 160 cited Justice Keith's dissent in holding that
in determining whether sexual conduct is unwelcome, as
required by Meritor, 161 courts must look to both the man's and
woman's perspective. 162 The Lipsett court stated that only
when courts consider both perspectives can they avoid "sustain[ing] ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned
by the offenders .... "163 Although Lipsett did not mandate the
use of the reasonable woman perspective in determining
whether harassment is severe or pervasive enough to create a
144. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
147. "A constructive discharge exists if 'working conditions would have been so
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have
felt compelled to resign'." Id. at 636-37 (quoting Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432
(6th Cir. 1982».
148. ld. at 637.
149. ld. at n.2 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir.
1986) (Keith, J., dissenting».
150. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
151. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
152. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898. But see Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hosp.,
901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990). The reasonable person standard determines whether conduct is actionably unwelcome and pervasive. Id. at 192·93.
153. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J.,
dissenting».
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hostile work environment, Lipsett recognized the importance
of the woman's perspective within hostile environment cases.
In 1990, the Third Circuit mandated the use of a "reasonable person of the same sex in that position" standard to determine whether alleged conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to state a claim under Title VII. 164 The Court explained that the
gender-based standard protects employers from undue liability at the hands of hyper-sensitive employees, while "removing
the walls of discrimination that deprive women of self-respecting employment. "166 The Third Circuit's standard is directly
analogous to Ellison's reasonable woman standard in that it is
gender-based, objective and recognizes the impact of the disparate perspectives held by men and women concerning appropriate sexual conduct. 166
Several other courts have recently adopted the victim oriented standard. In a case decided less than two months after
Ellison, the district court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 167man dated the use of the reasonable woman standard in determining whether conduct supports a hostile work
environment claim. l68 The Court reasoned that the "standard
assessing the psychological harm resulting from harassment
must begin to reflect women's sensitivity to behavior once
condoned as acceptable. "169 On the same day, another district
court decided Austen v. State of Hawaii, 160 which followed
Ellison in finding that the plaintiff's supervisor referred to her
in a manner that a reasonable woman would find typical of
males who consider women inferior. 161 A few weeks later, another district court cited Ellison in Harris v. International Paper
Co. 162 The Harris court held that the appropriate standard to
154. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
155. [d.
156. [d. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
157. 760 F. Supp. 1486, (M.D. Fla. 1991).
158. [d. at 1524. A reasonable woman would find that a hostile work environment
existed where sexual jokes and sexually oriented pictures of women were common and
where co-workers rejected women in a non-sexual manner simply because they were
women. [d.
159. [d. at 1526 (quoting Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards
in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1737-38 (1989».
160. 759 F. Supp. 612 (D. Haw. 1991).
161. [d. at 628. Austen showed impermissible sex discrimination and retaliation
against her for her support of women's issues and for filing an EEOC complaint. [d.
at 629.
162. 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me. 1991).
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apply in determining whether harassment on the basis of race
is sufficiently severe and pervasive to violate Title VII is that
of a reasonable black person. 163 The Court held that "[t]he different social experiences of men and women in the case of
sexual harassment, and of white Americans and black
Americans in the case of racial harassment" must be considered
to give "full force" to Title VII's concern with the consequences
of discrimination. 1M The legal evolution of hostile work environment claims displays the movement toward a solidification
of the reasonable woman's perspective in determining the viability of hostile workplace sexual harassment claims; Ellison
is in accord with this trend.
These cases reflect the fact that Congress intended Title VII
to remove "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to
employment."166 The principal barrier to employment for a
woman is the knowledge that she will or may be subjected to
an unpleasant or degrading atmosphere in the workplace.
The point of Title VII is to allow women to obtain "self-respecting employment. "166 In order to ensure that goal is reached, the
perspective of the person whose self-respect is at issue must logically be the focus.
Again, however, and as every court that has enunciated the
standard has stated, it is not just any woman's perspective, but
the "reasonable" woman's perspective that must be applied.
This is necessary to prevent employers from being subjected to
liability for claims by "hyper-sensitive" employees. 167 However,
in considering the "hyper-sensitive" person defense, courts
should take care to avoid the presumption indulged in by
some that any woman entering a certain type of workplace
should expect the atmosphere to be "rough hewn" and the
workplace to be filled with "sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines."168 Indeed, correcting that attitude may well be the most important effect of adopting the
"reasonable woman" standard.
163. [d. at 1516. "The appropriate standard to be applied in hostile environment
harassment cases is that of a reasonable person from the protected group of which the
alleged victim is a member." [d. at n.12.
164. [d. at 1515.
165. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
166. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990).
167. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
168. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 621·22.
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Even well-intentioned comments made to members of the
opposite sex may amount to sex discrimination because Title
VII is not concerned with the motivation behind conduct, but
is instead "aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice."169 Employers and employees alike must be sensitized to the reasonable woman's view of appropriate sexual
conduct in the workplace. 17o The Ninth Circuit's use of the
reasonable woman standard to determine whether sexual conduct supports an actionable hostile work environment claim
promotes a sensitization of the work force and encourages an
understanding of "what conduct offends reasonable members
of the other sex"171 in line with the intent behind Title VII.

c.

ELLISON'S EMPLOYER LIABILITY STANDARDS ENCOURAGE
SENSITIZATION OF THE WORK FORCE

Like the reasonable woman standard, Ellison's employer liability standards are not radical departures from existing law
and also encourage a sensitization of the work force. Employers
on notice of co-worker sexual harassment must take prompt and
appropriate remedial action to avoid Title VII liability.172 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the standard announced by the
Fourth Circuit in Katz that employer remedies must be "reasonably calculated to end the harassment. "173 This standard has
been widely accepted l74 and also supports Title VII's goal of providing a discrimination-free workplace.

Ellison added to the standard announced in Katz by requiring employers to "impose sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free from sexual harassment. "176 To reach this goal, an
employer's response must not just correct the specific problem,
but it must do so in a way that deters others from engaging in
such conduct. 176 Even in this respect, Ellison is not a significant
169. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 431). Additionally, 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(3) prohibits conduct that "has the pur·
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." (emphasis added).
170. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
171. [d. at 881.
172. See infra note 97.
173. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir.
1983».
174. E.g., Paroline v. UNISYS Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989); Barrett
v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984).
175. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882.
176. [d.
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departure from existing case law. It has been held that "Title
VII requires more than a mere request to refrain from discriminatory conduct."177 Further, the courts have also supported employer responses to sexual harassment, even though
they may go beyond that necessary to simply end the harass~
ment by the person engaging in it.178 Title VII's goal of discrimination-free working environments is greatly furthered by
Ellison's requirement that employer responses to sexual harassment assure a harassment-free workplace through both ending the particular harassment and preventing future
harassment through deterrent penalties.
D.

ELLISON'S MERE PRESENCE STANDARD AND TRADITIONAL

WRONGFUL TERMINATION LAW

Ellison's requirement that employers remove from the
workplace an employee whose mere presence would create a
hostile work environment to the reasonable woman is the
holding with potentially the greatest import for both employers and employees. Again, however, it is not a significant
change in existing law so much as a clarification of it. Firings
were often upheld in pre-Ellison wrongful termination suits
brought against employers who discharged employees for
engaging in sexual harassment. At common law, such terminations were usually upheld where the offender repeatedly and
severely harassed other employees. 179 In labor arbitration
suits,180 repeated incidents of sexual harassment usually warranted termination of the harasser. 181 Also at common law,
employers were not required to tolerate a hostile work
177. DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 805 n.5 (1st Cir. 1980). See Ellison, 924
F.2d at 882.
178. E.g., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984).
179. See, e.g., Carosella v. United States Postal Serv., 806 F.2d 638, 643 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (Termination proper where offender repeatedly asked out and engaged in
offensive touching); Williams v. Secretary of State, Merit Comm'n, 502 N.E.2d 770,
774-75 (4th Dist. 1987) (Termination upheld where offender used vulgar language,
made suggestive noises and tried to touch employee's breast and buttocks).
180. See generally CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE, 417-20 (1990) for discussion oflabor arbitration suits against employers for
the termination of harassers.
181. See, e.g., United Elec. Supply Co. and Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local I,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921 (1984) (Termination proper where harasser warned and severallater testified against him); IBP, Inc. and United Food Workers Int'l Union Local
222,89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 411 (1987) (Termination upheld where harasser repeatedly harassed co-worker at work and home and did not obtain employer- ordered
counseling).
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environment; the employee's conduct only needed to be likely
to adversely affect the functioning of the workplace. 182
The significance of Ellison is that it appears to require
removal, as opposed to merely allowing that as an option, if the
offender's mere presence would be an ongoing source of discomfort for a reasonable woman who had previously suffered
at the hands of the offender. Again, by incorporating the reasonable woman standard, Ellison does more than just encourage sensitization of employers to the problems faced by women
in the workplace. That goal is balanced with the need to assure
employers that they will not be forced to remove otherwise valuable employees because of problems that reflect personality conflicts arising from individual idiosyncracies rather than the
kind of gender directed hostility with which Title VII is
concerned.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Ellison is not, in the final analysis, a radical departure in
Title VII law. It is but the clearest statement yet of the evolving approach to sexual harassment claims and Title VII cases
generally. In Meritor, the Supreme Court recognized hostile
work environment cases which do not require the direct,
adverse economic impact on the plaintiff found in quid pro quo
cases. From this decision, it is a short and logical step to
Ellison's conclusion that the plaintiff in a hostile workplace case
need not have suffered direct, adverse and severe psychological injury to state a claim.
The Ellison court's adoption of the 'reasonable victim' test
is likewise a sound step in Title VII case law. It recognizes that
such standards are necessary to effectuate the Congressional
intent behind Title VII, which was and is the elimination of not
just blatant discrimination but of the subtle yet daunting barriers that have prevented whole classes of persons from even
trying to enter the workplace. It is only by viewing the workplace environment from the victim's perspective that employers can understand and begin to correct those problems. Such
employer sensitization is the necessary first step in eliminating the conduct that has kept women and other minorities
182. Carosella, 816 F.2d at 643 (quoting Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d
384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987».
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from fully participating in, and contributing to, the economic
life of the nation.
Finally, Ellison's standards for employer liability are simply recognition that a sensitized employer alone is not enough;
employees, too, need to understand the impact that their
behavior has, and that what they perceive as innocent fun
can in fact be emotionally damaging. Ellison requires employers to use the tools available to them, education and discipline,
to the fullest extent necessary to carry out the mission of Title
VII: a transformation in the way that individuals deal with each
other in the workplace.
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